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HealthCare Management Programme, Open University of Cyprus, Nicosia, CyprusA B S T R A C TBackground: Tendering has been a promising approach for procuring
pharmaceuticals. Signiﬁcant price reductions have been well docu-
mented by several authors. To our knowledge, there are limited data
detailing the impact of variables in the tendering process. Objectives:
In this article, our objective was to evaluate the impact of potentially
exploratory variables, which included innovation status, total value
and volume of sales of each product, health care setting administra-
tion (hospital/outpatient), patent status (branded/generic), tendering
type, and wholesale price, on price reduction in the tendering process.
Methods: Financial data of public sector sales during 2011 were
analyzed. On the basis of these data, we selected 178 medicines with
corresponding sales of €49 million, out of a total market value of €104
million. Medicines were selected according to volume, value, and
therapeutic value across all therapeutic areas. We performed a beta
regression for the assessment of impact of variables and applied the
same methodology to different subgroups. Conclusions: The genericee front matter Copyright & 2015, International S
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.1016/j.vhri.2015.09.001
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ndence to: Panagiotis Petrou, HealthCare Managemstatus of medicines is statistically signiﬁcantly associated with a
higher price reduction. Tendering type by alternative, high wholesale
prices, and high volume are robust estimators for price reduction.
Innovation status does not have any effect on price reduction. Out-
patient medicines reach lower prices as compared with hospital
medicines. A rather unexpected ﬁnding is the negative correlation of
high sales value with price reduction. These ﬁndings will lead to
better understanding of the tendering framework, enabling us to
further evolve its operational capacity, aiming to generate more
savings. Moreover, our study indicates areas in which a more
optimized approach is needed.
Keywords: health expenditure, innovation, pharmaceutical pricing and
reimbursement, pharmaceuticals, tendering.
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Pharmaceutical expenses are rising beyond the increase in
productivity, and they are stretching health systems beyond their
viability. Currently, pharmaceutical expenses constitute the fast-
est growing sector of total health expenses, being just second to
personnel expenses in term of recurrent costs [1].
Several factors contribute to this increase. The pharmaceut-
ical market is a highly heterogeneous and ﬂawed market [2],
imputed to its domination—value wise—by products enjoying
monopolistic and oligopolistic status. Factors that determine the
market nature are new expensive products, brand loyalty, and
increased asymmetry of information due to the level of uncer-
tainty [2].
In this context, steep price reductions stemming out of the
market exclusivity that tendering offers to successful bidders
have made tendering a necessary medicine procurement method
[3,4]. Nevertheless, this attribute is mediated by the imperative
need of a strict and detailed legal framework and the inherent
hazard of relying on one or a few suppliers for the entire market,
while at the same time sustaining the dynamic efﬁciency of theindustry. Consequently, in Europe, tendering has been used
principally in procuring bulk quantities such as vaccines and
dispensable products for hospitals, which are characterized by
low differentiation. Currently, only a few countries such as
Cyprus, Malta, and Iceland apply tendering in the outpatient
sector, whereas some other countries such as The Netherlands
and Belgium implement tendering selectively [3–6].
Cyprus is heavily fragmented into public and private health
sector care sectors, an attribute that applies to the pharmaceut-
ical market as well. Ofﬁcial prices of pharmaceuticals are set by
the Ministry of Health (MoH) at the wholesale level through
external reference pricing (ERP) based on a basket consisting of
one cheap, two medium, and one expensive European Union (EU)
countries. The retail price is set by adding a regressive mark-up
pharmacy proﬁt margin to the wholesale price. Cyprus is the only
EU country without a universal coverage national health system
(NHS). As a result, private health care costs burden patients
unless they are covered by an optional private health insurance
[7]. The long anticipated NHS has been postponed for 2017
because there are signiﬁcant debates regarding its structure and
operational mode [8]. The MoH provides free health care, inociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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criteria such as income, public servant employment tenure,
socioeconomic status, and disease severity. Because some of
the eligibility criteria for free public health beneﬁciary status
are rather biased, this has ultimately led to a grossly uneven
access to free public health care. The MoH procures all the
medicines for public health care beneﬁciaries through tendering.
All procured products must be registered in Cyprus, which
implies that they carry an ofﬁcial wholesale price as well apart
from the procurement price (the tender price). Tender outcome is
deﬁned as the price reduction compared with the wholesale price
of the product. On average, tender prices achieved by tendering
are 95% lower for generics and around 25% lower for branded
products. (This refers to the tender price—the winning bidding
price—compared with ofﬁcial wholesale price) [9]. The public
sector does not apply pharmacy mark-up proﬁt because public
pharmacists are public servants and they are remunerated by a
ﬁxed monthly salary. Because prices to the tender process are
submitted by marketing authorization holders (MaHs), the max-
imum price they can submit is the ofﬁcial wholesale price. The
key cost drivers of Cyprus’s public sector include oncology,
neurology, and immunosuppressive agents, whereas the corre-
sponding key cost drivers of the private sector are branded
statins, branded angiotensin receptor blockers (ARB), branded
proton pump inhibitors, and lifestyle products [10].
Despite the longstanding implementation of tendering in
Cyprus, there is no documented analysis of exploratory variables
that inﬂuence price reductions. The ﬁeld of price determinants in
the tendering process has been largely overlooked mainly
because of the perception that tendering is a short-term
approach and not a long-term health policy [11]. This is imputed
to fears raised about industry sustainability, failures in some
countries such as Belgium, and overestimated savings in The
Netherlands due to the counterpoising increase in pharmacists’
fees. All these factors, along with legal issues, hindered further
dissemination of tendering [11]. Consequently, no studies have
considered the dynamics of tendering and most speciﬁcally none
of these studies so far has measured the impact of the variables
and the extent of their impact on the tendering outcome.
Recently, an Italian study analyzed the impact of tendering on
biosimilars, with regard to the number of bidders [12]. Other
studies dealt with the conceptual framework of tendering and
with its quantitative impact [9,11]. In contrast, cross-country
variations in the prices of prescription medicines have been
studied by many authors and the ﬁeld of price determinants
raised considerable interest in the recent years [13,14].
The goal of this study was to examine which factors inﬂuence
the outcome of the tender, and to what extent. By identifying key
variables, we can capitalize on these, further augmenting the
efﬁciency of tendering.Methods
Study Design
We identiﬁed seven exploratory variables that may inﬂuence the
outcome of tendering and are associated either with intrinsic
attributes of the product or with extrinsic attributes of the
product stemming out of its positioning and its uptake in the
market. Price is the leading characteristic of a medicine and one
of the decisive factors for its reimbursement. Pricing is a context-
sensitive topic because a standoff must be achieved between
affordable prices for the payer and proﬁtable prices that will
warrant the R&D projects of the industry, the balance between
static and dynamic efﬁciency [15]. It was extensively argued that
prevailing pricing schemes such as ERP may reduce short-termexpenditure, but they are blunt instruments with regard to
rewarding the true added value of a new pharmaceutical product
[16,17]. This was the rationale behind the anticipated introduc-
tion of the value-based pricing scheme, that is, the alignment of
price with the real value of the product [18]. In this direction,
innovation status was deﬁned as another variable [19]. Cyprus
currently does not have a dedicated health technology assess-
ment agency. Because of this gap, and to assess the impact of
innovation on price reduction through tendering, we adopted the
Amelioration du Service Medical Rendu ([ASMR] [Improvement of
Medical Beneﬁt]) classiﬁcation of Haute Autorité de Santé in
France [20,21]. In France, pharmaceutical products are assessed
by the Commission of Pharmaceutical Evaluation on the basis of
ﬁve pillars:1. Efﬁcacy and safety;
2. Position of the medicine in the therapeutic strategy and the
existence or absence of therapeutic alternatives;
3. Severity of the disease;
4. Type of treatment: preventive, curative, or symptomatic; and
5. Public health impact.
After the assessment is concluded, each product is awarded
an improved medical beneﬁt level ASMR classiﬁcation ranging
from I to V as follows:1. ASMR I major improvement (new therapeutic area, reduction
in mortality);2. ASMR II signiﬁcant improvement in efﬁcacy and/or reduction
in adverse effects;3. ASMR III modest improvement in efﬁcacy and/or reduction in
adverse effects;4. ASMR IV minor improvement; and
5. ASMR V no improvement.
We adopted the French improved medical beneﬁt level clas-
siﬁcation for the products included in our sample to assess the
impact of innovation status. Tender type is also another impor-
tant variable and currently, three types of tendering are applied
in the Cyprus health setting. The ﬁrst type is the “International
Nonproprietary Name (INN) sole.” This tender type asks for a
speciﬁc medicine, by its INN name. There is virtually no com-
petition in this setting; therefore, we do not anticipate any
signiﬁcant price reduction. This, however, has to be counter-
balanced by law provision, which may reject the procurement of
a product should the Drug’s Committee decide that the submitted
price is high. The second type is the “INN group.” This type
applies for the procurement of several products of a speciﬁc
therapeutic category such as aromatase inhibitors and anti–
tumor necrosis factor agents and the elaboration of treatment
guidelines based on the results. This is applied in expensive and
specialized products in categories with high dropout rate and/or
low compliance, primarily for secondary care. In this tender type,
the cheapest product is set as a ﬁrst-line therapy while the other
products are set in subsequent treatment lines according to
prices. The third type is the “INN alternative.” This tender type
is used in high-volume primary care products that are perceived
to be interchangeable such as statins, angiotensin-converting
enzyme inhibitors, nonsteroidal anti-inﬂammatory drugs, and
proton pump inhibitors (e.g., omeprazole or lansoprazole) and
asks for only one product (usually among three or more).
We also assessed the impact of value and volume of sales on
the basis of assumption that a higher volume may yield signiﬁ-
cant savings, according to current literature in the ﬁeld of price-
volume agreement [22]. In addition to the above, the hospital or
outpatient administration status and the potential interrelation
with price reduction have not been studied. In Cyprus, current
Table 1 – Regression coefﬁcients of the beta regression model for the total sample.
Covariate Beta regression
Estimate Standard error P value
Mean model (logit link) intercept –1.8516 0.6770 0.006*
Wholesale price 0.0004 0.0001 o0.0001*
Value (log) –0.2506 0.6625 0.0001*
Tendering status
Alternative 0.8248 0.2047 o0.0001*
Group 0.4967 0.2488 0.045*
Hospital outpatient 0.4556 0.1533 0.0030* (outpatient)
Volume (packs) log 0.3808 0.0505 o0.0001*
Drug classiﬁcation patent status (generic) 0.7064 0.2149 0.0001* (for generics)
Pseudo R2: 0.3891.
* Denotes statistically signiﬁcant P value of o0.05.
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fore, we deemed it necessary to assess this variable because
hospital drugs incur additional costs to the payer related to the
administration of the product to the patient. As a result, it is
interesting to investigate whether by offering lower prices the
MaH makes up these additional costs that burden the payer.
Patent status has also been extensively documented in the
literature [23–25] and has been deﬁned as an exploratory variable.
Statistical Analysis
We used a beta regression to model the percentages of price
reduction that are bounded in the range (0%–100%). Conventional
regression analysis based on the normality assumption cannot be
used for modeling percentages; rather, their modeling can be
done more appropriately by using beta distribution regression. A
more detailed justiﬁcation of beta regression properties is well
documented in the literature [26]. In our regression model, the
dependent variable is the percentage price reduction in the
tendering process, which is assumed to follow a beta distribution.
The mean parameter of the beta distribution represents the
average achieved reduction value, which was found to be
dependent on the wholesale price, the logarithm of value, the
tendering status, the hospital/outpatient, the logarithms of
packs, and the drug classiﬁcation. Therefore, the regression
equation takes on the following form: Price reduction ¼ constant
þ a  innovation þ b  (hospital/outpatient) þ c  patent status þ
d  wholesale price þ e  volume þ f  value þ g  tender type
þ error where a, b, c, d, e, f, and g are the regression coefﬁcients.
We performed the above regression for the following ﬁve
subsets of our data set, namely:1. For the entire market;
2. For products that carry an ASMR classiﬁcation;
3. For branded products only;
4. For generic products only; and
5. For high-value medicines (products with sales of >€1,000,000
yearly value of sales).
Data Management
We collected ofﬁcial sales data from the MoH during 2011, and we
selected 178 products with sales of €49 million, corresponding to
approximately 50% of annual public pharmaceutical expenditure.
Sampling was done through a stratiﬁed sampling proce-
dure based on several stratums such as volume, value, and
therapeutic importance. Medicines refer to a speciﬁc dosageform, strength, and pack size of a speciﬁc molecule. Among the
selected products, 101 were assigned an ASMR status [20,21]. It is
possible for a product with more than one indication to carry two
ASMR classiﬁcations, which may vary on the basis of efﬁcacy for
each indication. Therefore, we picked the ASMR classiﬁcation for
the reimbursement indication of the respective product in
Cyprus. Among the sample, 13 products were assessed as ASMR
I, 14 products as ASMR II, 24 as ASMR III, 21 as ASMR IV, and 29
products as ASMR V.
Ethical Approval
The topic of this study did not require approval by the Bioethics
and Ethics Committee because it did not involve human subjects
or data that could lead to identiﬁcation of any patient.Results
Tables 1 to 5 list the results of the regression. Generic status had
a strong impact on price reduction, which was consistent across
all subcategories as well. Tendering by alternative (procuring only
one out of several competitive products) is associated with
statistically signiﬁcant price reductions in all categories. Tender-
ing by group demonstrated a statistically signiﬁcant correlation
with price reduction only in the total sample, whereas tendering
by INN (monopoly products) did not correlate with signiﬁcant
price reduction.
One consistent ﬁnding across all market segments is the
noncorrelation of innovation status with price reduction. Higher
wholesale prices are statistically signiﬁcantly associated with
higher price reduction, while a notable ﬁnding is the negative
correlation of total sales value with price reduction, except in the
cohort with ASMR-assigned status. This conﬂicts with another
consistent ﬁnding across categories, namely, signiﬁcant correla-
tion of volume with price reduction. In the total sample, out-
patient medicines were associated with a statistically signiﬁcant
impact on price reduction. This also occurred in the generics-only
category. Levels of pseudo R2 were satisfactory in all analyses,
indicating that the model ﬁt the data well.Discussion
The ﬁndings of the article are related to other ﬁndings in the
literature [9,11,12] that acknowledge that the tendering process
offers signiﬁcant price reductions. Our effort to decompose the
Table 2 – Regression coefﬁcients of the beta regression model for branded products only.
Covariate Beta regression
Estimate Standard error P value
Mean model (logit link) intercept –2.089 0.886 0.018*
Wholesale price 0.00028 0.0001 0.01*
Value (log) –0.165 0.080 0.040*
Innovation status
ASMR II 0.535 0.659 0.41
ASMR III 0.077 0.445 0.86
ASMR IV 0.345 0.500 0.48
ASMR V 0.243 0.585 0.67
Tendering status
Alternative 0.873 0.236 0.0002*
Group 0.467 0.270 0.088
Hospital outpatient –0.093 0.201 0.64
Volume in packs (log) 0.3339 0.062 7.75  10–08*
Pseudo R2: 0.1848.
ASMR, Amelioration du Service Medical Rendu.
* Denotes statistically signiﬁcant P value of o0.05.
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ing tendering dynamics and input of several variables.
Generic status (generic vs. branded) is the most important
factor, and many authors demonstrated the beneﬁcial input of
generic penetration in health systems worldwide [11,27–29].
Lower barriers of generic entry into the market and ready
availability of many competitors attest to this ﬁnding [30]. There-
fore, the entry of generics leads to steep price reductions and it
constitutes a signiﬁcant price determinant in the context of
tendering. In particular, Kanavos and Vandoros [13] also reported
that off-patent originator brands account for a signiﬁcant varia-
tion in prices. A major determinant of branded product is the
price composition because generic products are signiﬁcantly
cheaper as they do not incur any research and development
expenses. This ﬁnding is also intertwined with another predic-
tive factor, tendering by alternative (either–or), which isTable 3 – Regression coefﬁcients of the beta regression m
Covariate
Estimate
Mean model (logit link) intercept –7.9
Wholesale price 3.3
Value (log) –2.627  10–
Innovation status
ASMR II 3.188
ASMR III –1.28
ASMR IV –2.8  10–0
ASMR V –3.43  10–0
Tendering status
Alternative 5.841  10–0
1.276  10–0
Group
Hospital outpatient –0.1116
Volume in packs (log) 2.110  10–0
Drug classiﬁcation patent status (generic) 1.613  100
Pseudo R2: 0.2497.
ASMR, Amelioration du Service Medical Rendu.
* Denotes statistically signiﬁcant P value of o0.05.undisputedly the most efﬁcient form of tendering, although in
one case tendering by group (preferential policy) offers statisti-
cally signiﬁcant price reductions as well. In general, we con-
cluded that price reduction correlates with the level of
competition. This was also reported by Curto et al. [12] who
speciﬁed that participation of each additional bidder lowered
prices by 10%, a feature that is predominantly observed with
generics and biosimilars. This calls for more transparency in
the call for tender to facilitate the participation of more bidders.
The resulting competition or even the threat of entry of new
bidders in the process will ultimately augment the purchasing
power of the payer.
High sales volume is associated with signiﬁcant price reduc-
tion, which is in line with common practices of other countries
such as price-volume agreements [21]. Presumably, an MaH is
willing to offer lower prices for bigger quantities because theodel for products with ASMR classiﬁcation.
Beta regression
Standard error P value
1.014 0.43
2.496  10–01 0.000570*
02 0.96062 0.311
3.409  10–01 0.39
3.444  10–01 0.70
1 3.297  10–01 0.40
1 7.819  10–02 0.29
1 2.488  10–01 0.019253*
1 2.086  10–01
0.608116
0.1519 0.4628
1 1.418  10–06 0.000496*
0 3.367  10–01 1.67  10–06*
Table 4 – Regression coefﬁcients of the beta regression model for generic products only.
Covariate Beta regression
Estimate Standard error P value
Mean model (logit link) intercept –1.29 0.873 0.1381
Wholesale price 0.003 0.001 0.028*
Value (log) –0.431 0.115 0.0001*
Tendering status
Alternative 0.611 0.397 0.124
Group 0.593 0.586 0.310
Hospital outpatient 1.246 0.225 3.21  10–08*
Volume in packs (log) 0.538 0.087 8.67  10–10*
Pseudo R2: 0.4735.
* Denotes statistically signiﬁcant P value of o0.05.
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sanctions apply to the payer, as in the case of Cyprus.
However, the total value of sales has a negative statistically
signiﬁcant association with price reduction. One possible explan-
ation is that high-value products achieve so through the develop-
ment of a strong brand loyalty plan [31] that interacts with
patients and prescribers at the emotional level apart from the
functional beneﬁts [32]. It was shown that advertising of phar-
maceuticals comprises a strong product differentiation market-
ing tool that systematically lowers price sensitivity by enhancing
brand loyalty [33,34], while concomitantly increasing sales [35].
Moreover, in most of the incurable conditions, such as those
related to oncology, neurology, and rheumatology, patients are
treated with each approved pharmaceutical product sequentially
or in combination, which creates a “virtual monopoly” [36]. This
will enable the MaH to retain high prices for blockbusters. Only
for products that carry ASMR classiﬁcation (101 products;
Table 3), value is not statistically associated with price reduction.
A critical question to be raised concerns how we effectively
address this “anomaly” of the tendering process. A possible
approach would be regulation of the currently unregulated
pharmaceutical marketing framework, which could resist against
aggressive promotion of pharmaceuticals, an acknowledged pre-
requisite of strong brand loyalty [37].Table 5 – Regression coefﬁcients of the beta regression m
annually.
Covariate
Estimate
Mean model (logit link) intercept –2.1095
Wholesale price 2.3932
Value (log) –2.4448
Innovation status
ASMR II 0.65
ASMR III 0.57
ASMR IV 0.26
ASMR V 0.47
Tendering status
Alternative 0.1300
Group 0.2934
Hospital outpatient –0.1116
Volume in packs (log) 2.4719
Pseudo R2: 0.53.
ASMR, Amelioration du Service Medical Rendu.
* Denotes statistically signiﬁcant P value of o0.05.In addition to the above, high wholesale prices have a positive
relation with price reduction, suggesting that expensive products
lead to a greater price reduction. In conjunction with previous
ﬁndings, the negative correlation of wholesale value with price
reduction, we can conclude that expensive new products enter-
ing the market offer lower prices, but as their market value
increases, the price reduction diminishes. A possible explanation
is the submission of a low price to enter the market. After the
product has reached the “star”marketing phase, industry is less
keen to reduce the price, probably due to the creation of a strong
loyalty brand and rapport with patients and stakeholders (the
star marketing phase describes the high growth and proﬁt phase
of pharmaceuticals). This ﬁnding can also be ascribed to the fact
that prices of some products are high due to small target group,
their high uncertainty, and not due to actual production costs
incurred by the company. Therefore, it seems that companies
may have the capacity to submit lower prices. It is also possible
that MaHs can sustain high prices when they take into account
the future demand for a subsequent price reduction.
Moreover, social solidarity principles often persuade people to
pay substantially more for serious health conditions, even for
marginal health gains. Pricing must also be interpreted in the
notion that ERP is considered to be a cost-containment tool and
lacks any theoretical basis. Usually other factors protrude intoodel for products with sales value of >€1,000,000
Beta regression
Standard error P value
1.0865 0.052
0.1889 o2  10–16*
0.1806 o2  10–16*
0.659 0.52
0.51 0.73
0.58 0.55
0.85 0.17
0.1852 0.4828
0.1765 0.0964*
0.1519 0.4628
0.1665 o2  10–16*
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proximity and access to prices. In the World Health Organiza-
tion/Health Action International (HAI) Project Medicine Prices and
Availability [38], authors stated that it is doubtful whether the
ERP is “appropriate, efﬁcient or optimal in accordance with any
objective criterion.” The risk of dissemination of ﬂawed pricing
also lurks, especially for countries that follow referencing coun-
tries, while industry actively pursues higher prices in ﬁrst-to-
launch countries, and this creates a spillover effect. However,
low-price countries face the risk of a late launch, which often
results in loss of utility. Finally, the referencing system levels off
easily and stabilizes [39].
One of the most important ﬁndings is the lack of a correlation
between the innovation level and the price reduction. This leads
to loss of optimality because the payer may acquire less utility for
the same monetary value. The current prevailing pricing scheme
ERP has been criticized as impeding R&D because it does not
provide incentives for innovation [40]. These ﬁndings are contra-
dictory in terms of the current shift of leading health agencies,
such as the National Health Service and the Institute for Quality
and Efﬁciency in Healthcare (IQWIG) [41,42], which are gradually
fostering value-based pricing, a pricing system that aligns the
price of a product to its therapeutic value, aiming to reward and
promote genuine innovation. Although value-based pricing
stalled in the United Kingdom, the underlying reasons for its
implementation are still imperative and the need for aligning the
price to the clinical value of the product is still unmet. In this
sense, we expected that products with a low innovation status
(i.e., modest improvement) would be willing to submit lower
prices given that their demand is correspondingly low; never-
theless, this did not materialize. We also expected that truly
innovative products could retain high prices, because of lack
of substitution, which was not conﬁrmed as well. This can be
ascribed to the ﬂawed selection of comparative products for the
tender. Therefore, it is crucial that competitive products are
considered on grounds of evidence-based medicines.
We also assessed the hospital/outpatient status of medicine
and its ability to inﬂuence the price of products. Doctors are
inclined or even pushed to prescribe medicines in Cyprus, and
overuse of prescribed medicines, such as antibiotics, has been
well documented [43]. Therefore, we anticipated that the demand
for medicines is more likely to be inﬂuenced by patient request
regarding prescription medicine, compared with hospital-
administered medicines. Hospital medicines carry a higher pos-
sibility of substitution, and we expected that hospital medicines
would display higher price elasticity. Outpatient medicines
reached a statistically signiﬁcant lower level of price reduction.
This could be attributed to interaction with patients in the
prescribing process and the higher number of alternative options,
which leads to enhanced competition.
In the category with products with sales of more than
€1,000,000 each (products that are considered blockbusters in
the Cyprus context), we veriﬁed our previous ﬁndings, conﬁrming
that the level of innovation is not a prognostic factor and is not
associated with price reduction (Table 5). This category emerges
as a vital one because it consists of key cost drivers and highly
specialized products and it demonstrates high annual increase
rate [44]. Moreover, their cost is prohibitive for out-of-pocket
procurement and patients exert signiﬁcant pressure on health
agencies for reimbursement of these products. Wholesale price
still has a statistically signiﬁcant association with price reduc-
tion; nevertheless, total value displays a negative statistically
signiﬁcant association with price reduction, in line with previous
ﬁndings. Volume is also a strong prognostic factor.
Tendering does not interfere with the inextricable European
reference pricing scheme, which results in signiﬁcant interrela-
tion of medicines’ prices among EU countries. This constitutes amotive for the company to consent to a reduced but locally
constrained tender price—as an outcome of a procurement
scheme—which in return avoids a spillover effect on pharma-
ceutical prices in other EU countries should the payer decide to
apply price reduction.
Tendering is a potent system and excels in primary care,
whereas it seems to lack sensitivity in high-value products. It
neither addresses uncertainty nor rewards innovation. The prin-
cipal question is how to enrich the potency of tendering with
selectivity. A promising approach is to enrich the tendering types
and include a compulsory payback for products that do not
possess superior performance. Alternative, risk-sharing projects
[45] or other managed entry agreement schemes [46,47] may
complement the tendering system. One comparative advantage
of tendering versus risk sharing, however, is that tendering
addresses affordability, while risk sharing does not.
Limitations
We acknowledge that several other factors that have not been
considered in our current models may inﬂuence price reduction
such as ﬁscal pressures on the company, signiﬁcance of each
product within a company’s portfolio, and colloquial pressures by
patients’ associations and media. Moreover, we adopted the
health technology assessment from France with all the inherent
risk it comprises [48].Conclusions
Our analysis indicates that tendering is a potent system and it is
inﬂuenced by certain parameters. The impact of tendering must
be safeguarded and must be complemented with other
approaches to reach even higher levels of performance. The
insensitivity to innovation level has to be scrutinized as well as
the negative correlation of total value with price reduction.
Capitalizing on correlating factors will further enhance tendering.
The present data refer to a small country that has gained
signiﬁcant expertise in tendering and succeeded in maximizing
its efﬁciency. Therefore, we expect that other countries, by
capitalizing on our ﬁndings, can attain signiﬁcant gains.
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